Internet Review of Books - "The Commission"

My review of The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Commission as it was published on the Internet Review of Books in April of 2008.

I teach English to eighth graders, and one of the critical parts of my job is monitoring and critiquing social interaction. How students group themselves for a purpose is often fascinating, and the identifying characteristics of a “student grouping” are anecdotally known. Groups of individuals, seldom chosen for their abilities, come together simply because they are “good friends.” We’d like to think that after we walk out of those hallowed halls of middle school, this grouping ability gets better. As Philip Shenon proves, it doesn’t.

The Commission is a book that is deeply frightening. Shenon has researched a world in which warnings of an imminent attack were ignored, decisions were made based on party-line politics and not facts, and, most disturbingly, a “good old boy” network exists that will protect any failings.

This “good old boy” network began and was imported to Washington from Texas with President George W. Bush. Shenon describes a standing Bush administration policy of “message discipline.” “This White House seemed unwilling to tolerate public dissent, so it was almost never heard,” according to Tom Kean, the commission’s chairman, “even if it left Bush’s aides sounding robotic and unthinking in their public appearance.” This unthinking and “unquestioned loyalty to Bush and his family” became an integral aspect of the post 9/11 reaction. The idea of loyalty above all else led individuals involved in the commission to avoid using their power to its fullest. Subpoenas simply were not requested; cooperation that was promised was not given, and not pursued. According to Shenon, the “circling of the wagons” at the White House imposed a gag order so stringent that it almost stifled independent and rational thought.

Commisioners of the group were told that they had to “stand up,” “have courage,” and not allow the investigating body to become a “runaway commission.” Commissioner Kean “wanted to assume that he was being told by the White House to ‘stand up’ for the truth and to show ‘courage’ in following the trail of evidence about 9/11” The truth, as Shenon tells it, was far different.

“When Bush’s aides told him to ‘stand up,’ what they meant was that Kean and the commission needed to ‘stand up for the president,’ not necessarily for the truth. The truth was secondary. ‘You’ve got to stand up for the president and you’ve got to protect him in the process. That’s what they meant.’ It appeared that a ‘runaway commission’ was one that issued a final report concluding that Bush and his White House bore some responsibility for 9/11. ‘That was their nightmare,’ Kean said later. ‘I think they never lost that fear.’”

The “cloak and dagger” meetings and discussions that the 9/11 commission was involved in were eerily reminiscent of the meetings that are described in parallel between the terrorist cells that planned the destruction. The private phone calls and conspiratorial tones of the commissioners and their staff were disturbingly secretive. It was the type of secrecy that contributes directly to the vast number of conspiracy theories that exist in the world today. When answers are not forthcoming from a central authority, or worse, that central authority seems to be misleading the public, people will come up with their own interpretations.

One of Shenon’s strongest accomplishments in writing this book was to capture the frustrations and true feelings of the individuals involved. This is not a historical text in which the characters are measured purely on the basis of their actions, but also on the investment of emotion in the task at hand. In describing the commission’s choice for an individual to lead the day-to-day affairs of the group, Shenon reports the feelings of Richard A. Clarke, late of the National Security Council.

“Zelikow? Philip Zelikow?...‘The fix is in,’ said Clarke. He knew and disliked Zelikow. Christ, how could anybody be so stupid? He wondered. Condi’s [Condoleeza Rice’s] friend?”

This ability to explain a story on levels that are easily grasped helps us make sense of the 9/11 Commission’s report.

Reading this book as I have been in the moments between my classes, I am struck with a new realization. The next time I put my students into a group and watch them find their friends, watch them neglect those who could actually function well in the group and ignore those they dislike even if best qualified, I am going to be inescapably drawing parallels to my government. The thought is deeply frightening.